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Abstract: For wireless sensor networks (WSNs), many factors, such as mutual interference 
of wireless links, battlefield applications and nodes exposed to the environment without 
good physical protection, result in the sensor nodes being more vulnerable to be attacked 
and  compromised.  In  order  to  address  this  network  security  problem,  a  novel  trust 
evaluation  algorithm  defined  as  NBBTE  (Node  Behavioral  Strategies  Banding  Belief 
Theory of the Trust Evaluation Algorithm) is proposed, which integrates the approach of 
nodes behavioral strategies and modified evidence theory. According to the behaviors of 
sensor nodes, a variety of trust factors and coefficients related to the network application 
are  established  to  obtain  direct  and  indirect  trust  values  through  calculating  weighted 
average of trust factors. Meanwhile, the fuzzy set method is applied to form the basic input 
vector of evidence. On this basis, the evidence difference is calculated between the indirect 
and direct trust values, which link the revised D-S evidence combination rule to finally 
synthesize integrated trust value of nodes. The simulation results show that NBBTE can 
effectively identify malicious nodes and reflects the characteristic of trust value that ‘hard 
to acquire and easy to lose’. Furthermore, it is obvious that the proposed scheme has an 
outstanding advantage in terms of illustrating the real contribution of different nodes to 
trust evaluation. 
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; network security; trust evaluation; node behaviors; 
evidence theory 
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1. Introduction 
Recent technology development in the fields of wireless communication and MEMS has facilitated 
the extensive distribution of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) which are reliable, accurate, flexible, 
inexpensive  and  easy  to  deploy.  In  many  applications,  for  instance,  environment  monitoring  and 
battlefield spying, the nodes are vulnerable to be attacked by passive eavesdropping, active intrusion, 
message  flooding,  fake  information  inserting,  etc.  Among  the  above  hostile  attacks,  passive 
eavesdropping helps adversaries intercept private information. Active intrusion makes it possible for 
adversaries to delete information, insert false information or impersonate nodes, which destroy the 
usability, integrality, security certificate and non-reputation of WSNs. Unfortunately, the available 
complicated encryption algorithms are unsuitable for WSNs because of the restricted capabilities of 
low  cost  nodes.  Hence,  the  WSNs  usually  adopt  security  method  based  on  symmetric  
cryptographic methods.  
However, the intrusion detection and prevention schemes with cryptographic protection are unable 
to identify the destructive threat by the authenticated nodes which have been compromised. If the 
compromised nodes cannot be identified in time, secret information may be revealed and the whole 
network could be under the control of the adversaries. Therefore, an efficient mechanism is urgently 
needed to identify the compromised nodes and take measures to minimize the destruction or loss in  
the network.  
Trust management is fundamental to identify malicious, selfish and compromised nodes which have 
been authenticated. It has been widely studied in many network environments such as peer-to-peer 
networks, grid and pervasive computing and so on. However, in reality, sensor nodes have limited 
resources and other special characters, which make trust management for WSNs more significant and 
challenging. Up to the present, research on the trust management mechanisms of WSNs have mainly 
focused on nodes’ trust evaluation to enhance the security and robustness. The practical applications of 
this method include the route, data integration and cluster head vote [1]. 
Although some existing approaches play good roles in improving security of other networks, trust 
management in WSNs still remains a challenging field. In this paper, we propose NBBTE algorithm by 
analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of existed methods [2-24]. Firstly, each node establishes 
the direct and indirect trust values of neighbor nodes by comprehensively considering various trust 
factors, and combining these factors together with network security grade, correlation of context time 
and  rewards  degree.  The  trust  factors  mentioned  above  include  packet  receive,  send,  strictness, 
delivery,  consistency  and  availability,  etc.  Secondly,  fuzzy  set  theory  is  used  to  decide  the 
trustworthiness levels in accordance with the fuzzy subset grade of membership functions. Based on 
the levels of trustworthiness, the basic confidence function of D-S evidence theory is accordingly 
formed. Finally, using the revised Dempster rules of combination, the integrated trust value of a node 
is obtained by integrating its trustworthiness of multiple neighbor nodes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work. Section 3 
describes  the  related  notions  and  parameters.  In  Section  4,  the  proposed  scheme  is  specifically 
depicted, including its design idea and practical implement approach. The performance of the scheme 
is mainly evaluated in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we make some concluding remarks. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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2. Related Work 
The  trust  management  methods  can  be  classified  into  two  categories:  distributive  authorization 
system based on trust chain and network trust evaluation system based on nodes’ behaviors [2-5].  
(1) In the former system, the authorized individual is allowed to collect all the information of other 
authorized ones. It checks the consistency through strategy inference engine in light of local policy and 
authorization requirements. In addition, if a trust chain exists between two strange individuals, the 
authorization is able to be relayed by signing indirect objects which have trust rights. That is to say, the 
authorization individual has rights to deal with its trusted objects. But it is very dangerous for the 
limited resources of WSNs when the authorization nodes are compromised. (2) In the latter system, 
individuals acquire all kinds of related information, including the actions of evaluated individuals, 
interacting rules and other individuals’ opinions. Then, the sensor nodes obtain other nodes’ trust value 
by different computing method in application. This trust management method has advantages of less 
resources consumption, peer-to-peer structure and no centers. Therefore, trust management schemes 
similar to the latter one are more frequently applied in the WSNs. 
Viljanen [6] came up with all kinds of ingredients of trust evaluation after nearly ten years of 
research on the trust of the network, which has a guiding effect on trust measurement of the sensor 
nodes in WSNs. Crosby et al. [7] propose a trust evaluation model based on the classical probability 
model,  which  uses  simple  statistical  methods  to  accomplish  trust  value  computation  without 
considering the trust recommendation between sensor nodes. Therefore, it cannot reflect nodes’ real-time 
trust state accurately. Ganeriwal et al. [8] make a trust evaluation model and uncertainty analysis based 
on Bayes theory. Because the lack of prior knowledge about wireless sensor networks, the model’s 
subjective assumptions of prior distribution aggravates the uncertainty of trust. These two models both 
regard the subject fuzziness of trust as the randomness and use pure probability statistic method to 
assess trustworthiness, which is  difficult to obtain prior knowledge from practical application and 
inevitably result in something unreasonable.  
In order to deal with the subjective fuzziness of trust evaluation, Tang et al. [9] propose a trust 
evaluation model based on fuzzy logic, which provides a formalized inference mechanism and does 
not give specific trust calculation methods. Krasniewski et al. [10] use the base station to make a 
centralized trust management of cluster head election. If the cluster head is unbelievable, a new one 
will be elected in another round to avoid effectively malicious or selfish node to act as cluster head. 
But the centralized trust management model increases the network communication payload and the 
passive trust decision-making slows down the convergent speed of cluster head election. Song et al. [11] 
add trust component to the LEACH algorithm, where nodes select the highest trust value one from 
their neighbors as cluster head. Although the distributed algorithm in this scheme has high convergent 
speed, reputation-based trust management may be vulnerable to collusion attacking. TRANS [12,13], 
which is proposed by Tanachaiwiwat et al., searches and marks the suspicious positions in WSNs 
based on the geographic information route. It puts the nodes at the suspicious positions on a black list 
and broadcasts them to all the other nodes, thereby achieving trust-based secure routing. But there is 
the possibility that some nodes are misjudged to be malicious because of the abominable channel or 
compromised nodes. Consequently, it requires a mechanism to allow the nodes in black list to turn into 
usable nodes again, whereas the model neglects this point. Hur et al. [14,15] divide the network into Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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several grids, which accomplishes secure data integration by crosschecking the consistency of nodes’ 
data, but collusion attacks are not able to be resisted very well.  
PTM [16-18], a research sub-item of UBISEC (secure pervasive computing) supported by Europe 
IST FP6, which builds models mainly in accordance with revised D-S evidence theory, defines the 
inter-domain dynamic trust management based on the pervasive environment. The approach makes a 
strict punishment to malicious actions and has good computing convergence and scalability. But the 
shortage of the PTM is that it obtains indirect trust value on average without taking the fuzziness, 
subjectivity and uncertainty into account.  
Hsieh et al. [19] use cluster-based structure to ensure the security of wireless sensor networks which 
includes two modules: (1) the dynamic key authorization is adopted to prevent external malicious 
nodes  from  entering  when  a  new  cluster  is  established  or  a  new  node  joins  in  the  cluster.  
(2) The nodes in the cluster detect each other and different trust computing methods are formulated 
based on the different roles nodes act as. The approach is difficult to implement and exists weak 
computing convergence.  
Marmol et al. [20] carry out a wide review of different trust models, provide some pre-standardization 
recommendations and propose an interface proposal for trust models. Lopez et al. [21] list the best 
practices that are essential for developing a good trust management system for WSN and make an 
analysis of the state of the art related to these practices. These two references make an excellent 
summary, propose many profound viewpoints and show an additional insight on the trust evaluation 
field.  In  addition,  other  protocols  [22-24]  address  trust  management  methods  in  self-organization 
networks from different views. 
3. Preliminaries 
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  overall  architecture  of  the  NBBTE  and  various  parameter 
definitions, including all sorts of trust factors, the fuzzy subset grade of membership functions, the 
calculation methods of trust worthiness based on the D-S theory. 
3.1. Definitions of Trust Factors 
The  trust  relationship,  developing  from  sociology  and  economics,  has  strong  subjectivity  and 
uncertainty. The accurate and applicable trust metric is the precondition of establishing nodes’ trust 
degree. Some trust factors are analyzed from different viewpoints [15,16,20]. Inspired by these works, 
we define the composing elements of trust value according to the sensor nodes’ behavioral features to 
resolve common attacks and protect the network [1,21]. When node i evaluates the trust degree on  
the node j: 
(1) The factor of received packets rate RPFi,j(t): the change of node j’s received packets rate in 
period t. 
(2) The factor of successfully sending packets rate SPFi,j(t): node j’s successful rate of sending 
packets in period t. 
(3) The factor of packets forwarding rate TPFi,j(t): the relation between sent packets and received 
packets of node j in period t. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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(4)  The  factor  of  data  consistency  CPFi,j(t):  the  degree  of  difference  for  sending  data  packets 
between node j and its neighbor nodes. 
(5) The factor of time frequency TFF(t): time relativity of context content in period t. 
(6) The factor of node availability HPFi,j(t): the relativity between hello packets sent and ACK 
feedbacks received by node i. 
(7) Security grade SG: we define different security requirement according to the application fields 
of network (Battle field, emergency response, civil environment etc.). 
3.2. Fuzzy Classification of Trust Relationship between Nodes 
The  trust  degrees  among  sensor  nodes  are  subjective  and  uncertain,  which  is  decided  by  two 
aspects: (1) the classification of trust is not based on the ‘two-valued logic’ but ‘multiple-valued logic’. 
(2) A certain trust value may belong to various trust grades rather than merely one grade. Thus, fuzzy 
theory is more suitable to describe and deal with fuzzy notions compared with traditional mathematical 
models. In this paper, we provide an efficient approach to make a quantitative research on subjective 
trust relationship by making the use of membership degree and language variables in the fuzzy theory. 
The specific fuzzy classification of nodes’ trust is as following. Firstly, the trust is divided into three 
grades: completely distrust, uncertain and completely trust state. Secondly, according to the three grades, 
it marks up three fuzzy subsets T1, T2 and T3 on the universe of nodes’ trust value T ([0,1]), as shown 
in Figure 1. The corresponding membership functions are u1(t), u2(t) and u3(t), u1(t) + u2(t) + u3(t) = 1. 
Figure 1. The membership function of node’s trust. 
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3.3. Related Definitions and Rules in D-S Evidence Theory 
The integrated trust value of one node given by its neighbor nodes cannot be simply established by 
weighted  average  due  to  the  subjectivity  of  trust  evaluation.  While  evidence  theory  proposed  by 
Dempster  and  Shafer  can  briefly  express  the  important  conceptions,  such  as  ‘uncertainty’  or  
‘not-knowing’. In addition, it makes right judgments by efficiently integrating many-sided uncertain 
information. Motivated by this, we take advantage of D-S evidence theory to compute integrated trust 
evaluation of nodes. 
D-S evidence theory [25] is based on the Ω set comprised by basic propositions which are both 
exclusive and exhaustive, termed identification frame. 2
Ω is the power set of Ω, that is, the set of all the 
possible propositions based on Ω. Here we define Ω as {T, −T}, where T and −T represent two trust Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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states, namely credible and incredible. 2
Ω is {Φ,{T},{−T},{T, −T}}, in which Φ, {T}, {−T} and {T, −T} 
represent respectively the empty set, the propositions of nodes’ ‘Trust’, ‘Distrust’ and ‘Uncertain’. 
There  are  definitions  of  basic  reliability  function  m  on  2
Ω:2
Ω  →  [0,1],  reliability  function  
Bel: 2
Ω → [0,1] and likelihood function Pl: 2
Ω → [0,1], satisfying the following equations: 
( ) 0               
( ) 1,
A
m
m A A

  
   
 
  (1)  
( ) ( ),
BA
Bel A m B A

      
(2)  
( ) 1 ( )     Pl A Bel A A      ，   (3)  
where: A is named focal element, m(A) is the basic confidence level of A, representing how much the 
evidence  support  A  to  happen.  Pl(A)  and  Bel(A)  are  the  confidence  level  and  likelihood  of  A,  
Bel(T) = m({T}), Pl(T) = m({T}) + m({T, −T}).  
In our proposed algorithm, the nodes evaluate each other to acquire some of the seven trust degrees 
which are the probability forms. To reflect the subjectivity, uncertainty  and fuzziness of trust, we 
transform  probability  forms  of  the  trust  degrees  to  the  vector  forms  by  using  fuzzy  membership 
function and D-S evidence theory, and each element in this vector represents the calculated basic 
confidence level to the ‘Distrust’, ‘Uncertain’, ‘Trust’ propositions of nodes.  
As for the integrated trust value which should combine the direct and indirect trust values, we make 
a combination of multiple evidences according to the revised Dempster rule, which will be described 
in detail in Section 4.2.2. 
4. NBBTE Algorithm 
As  described  in  the  introduction,  the  NBBTE  algorithm  firstly  establishes  various  trust  factors 
depending on the interactions between neighbor nodes, which are observed by each other. Then the 
trust  value  is  obtained  by  combining  network  security  degree  and  correlation  of  time  context. 
Secondly, it applies the fuzzy set theory to measure how much the trust value of node belongs to each 
trust  degree.  Finally,  the  integrated  trust  value  of  evaluation  considering  the  recommendation  of 
several neighbor nodes is acquired in accordance with the trust difference between evidences and the 
revised Dempster rule of combination. 
4.1. Trust Evaluation Approach between Neighbor Nodes 
Trust depends on a subject’s (evaluating node) observation on the object (evaluated node) and third 
party recommendations. The WSNs’ features need a trust evaluation mechanism without central nodes, 
where neighbor nodes monitor each other. The subject obtains the trust value of objects according to 
both direct and indirect trust values. As shown in Figure 2, the node i is subject, which not only makes 
direct assessment of object j, but also makes indirect evaluation of object j through nodes k1, k2, k3. 
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Figure 2. The recommendation trust relationship among nodes. 
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4.1.1. Trust Factors 
It is essential to make quantitative and qualitative analysis of various factors which affect trust value 
in order to evaluate a node’s trust worthiness. In the following, we explain the establishment scheme of 
trust factors defined in Section 3.1. We assume that node i makes trust evaluation for node j and ACK 
mechanism  is  adopted.  In  other  words,  once  the  node  receives  a  packet,  it  sends  ACK  feedback 
information to the sender. 
(1) The factor of received packets rate RPFi,j(t): According to the assumption, if node i monitors 
node j to confirm how many common ACK packets node j sends, the ratio of packets received by node 
j can be obtained. According to the change of the ratio, we can know whether node j has response 
forging behavior. If the change maintains in the interval (−ξ, ξ) in different periods, node j works 
normally.  The  calculation  equation  is  as  follows  (RPij(t)  represents  the  number  of  
received packets): 
,
( ) ( 1)
()
( ) ( 1)
ij ij
ij
ij ij
RP t RP t
RPF t
RP t RP t



  (4)  
(2) The factor of successfully sending packets rate SPFi,j(t): Assume that j sends packets to k who is 
beyond the communication scope of i. Although i cannot monitor the successfully sent packets rate of j 
directly in this situation, node i can monitor the number of the same packets sent by j. It’s known that 
every packet sent by nodes contains a time stamp and can be distinguished efficiently even if the 
packets have the same content. Thus, we can obtain the sending number of a certain packet according 
to different time stamps. The equation as follows (SPij(t) is the needing number of sent packets, SFij(t) 
is the repeating number of sent packets): 
,
()
()
( ) ( )
ij
ij
ij ij
SP t
SPF t
SP t SF t


  (5)  
(3) The rate of data forwarding TPFi,j(t): Multi-hop is usually necessary since most of nodes are 
impossible to communicate with the base station directly. If node k is beyond the communication range 
of node i and sends data packets to node j, node i cannot monitor the received packets number of node Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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j directly and has to collect the ACK feedback information of node j to obtain the number of received 
packets. In order to distinguish the forwarding packets and the remained packets, an ACK packet 
which contains a special bit is constructed. Once node j receives a forwarding packet, it broadcasts an 
ACK packet above. Then node i can collect these ACK packets of node j to obtain the number of 
forwarding packets. According to the change rate of TPFi,j(t), it can efficiently avoid Sinkhole attack 
and Sybil attack, as well as identify whether the node is selfish. The equation as follows (FPij(t) is the 
number of transmission packets): 
,
( ) ( 1)
()
( ) ( 1)
ij ij
ij
ij ij
FP t FP t
TPF t
FP t FP t



  (6)  
(4) The consistency factor CPFi,j(t): The data packets have spatial correlation, that is, the packets 
sent  among  neighbor  nodes  are  similar  in  the  same  area  according  to  the  application.  So  the 
consistency factor is introduced to prevent malicious nodes from modifying primary data packets. 
Node i acquires a packet transmitted by j randomly and makes the comparison with its own data. If the 
source node of this packet is in the same area of node i and the diversity rate maintains in the interval 
(−ξ, ξ), the number of accordant packets increases. Elsewise, if the source node does not belong to the 
area of node i, the consistency factor between node i and node j would not be adopted. The CPFi,j(t) 
equation as follows (EPij(t) is the number of accordant packets, NEPij(t) is the discordant one): 
,
()
()
( ) ( )
ij
ij
ij ij
EP t
CPF t
EP t NEP t


  (7)  
(5) Time factor TFF(t): Trust value has context relationship in time and content, and changes on the 
previous base. The size of time grade is dependent on the specific situation. If it is established too 
large, integrated trust value will be affected by history too heavily, which may cause errors in node 
evaluation. On the contrary, if it is established too small, trust value relies on a single period overly. 
Above all, we have the rules based on the security degree of networks. When the security degree is 
relatively high, TFF(t) = 0.8, relatively low, TFF(t) = 0.2, normally, TFF(t) = 0.5.  
(6) The factor of availability HPFi,j(t): In some cases, the neighbor nodes are inaccessible due to 
wireless channel interference or bad environment. Concretely, node i sends HELLO packets for the 
detection whether they can be received by node j. If node i receive the ACK-HELLO packets from 
node j, it is proved that node j is accessible. The HPFi,j(t) equation as follows (ACK ij(t) is the amount 
of  packets  which  have  been  responded,  NACKij(t)  is  the  amount  of  packets  which  haven’t  
been responded): 
,
()
()
( ) ( )
ij
ij
ij ij
ACK t
HPF t
ACK t NACK t


  (8)  
(7)  Security  grade  SG:  According  to  specific  application  environment  and  scenario, the  WSNs 
require different security degree based on different needs. For instance, there is a large difference 
between batter filed application and environmental monitor. When security requirement is high, SG = 3, 
relatively low, SG = 1; normally, SG = 2.  
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4.1.2. Trust Calculation between Neighbor Nodes 
As shown in Figure 2, trust evaluation of the subject to object includes direct evaluation DTE and 
indirect evaluation ITE. For example, if node j is evaluated, node i not only obtains the trust value of 
node j by itself directly but also through k1, k2 and k3 indirectly. And then node i integrates the two 
kinds of trust values to get an integrated one (for node j). Trust in the network has the feature ‘hard to 
acquire and easy to lose’. There are two trust initialization strategies: the pessimistic and the optimistic 
strategy. The pessimistic strategy can eliminate the possibility that the malicious node creates a new 
identity and impersonates a new node to rejoin in the network with the purpose of throwing away its 
bad trust value [21]. While the optimistic one has the foundation of completely trust at the beginning 
of network deployment, and is propitious to the quick network expansion. Therefore, in the initial 
period, trust value between neighbor nodes is depended on the factual application. Then, the trust of 
nodes changes gradually depending on behavior, history and time. 
(1) DTE Evaluation Approach 
For ensuring the reasonability of trust evaluation approach, different action parameters μ must be 
constituted  in  the  different  periods.  For  instance,  in  one  period,  node  i  and  j  interact  with  each  
other 10,000 times and the satisfactory actions are 5,000. In another period, they interact 1,000 times 
and the satisfactory actions are 500. Both periods have a satisfactory action rate of 0.5, obviously, the 
former is more believable. Therefore, we have the action parameter equation as follows: 
( ) / ( ( ) ( ))
=
( 1) /[ ( 1) ( 1)]
ij ij ij
ij ij ij
S t F t S t
S t F t S t


   
  (9)  
where: Sij(t) is the number of success, Fij(t) is the number of failure. In accordance with the trust 
factors in Section 4.1.1, combining with node recourse and network function environment, the direct 
trust value DTEi,j(t) is:  
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , ,
( ) ( ) [ (1 | ( )|) | ( )| (1 | ( )|)
| ( )| | ( )|] (1 ( )) ( 1)
SG
i j i j i j i j
i j i j i j
DTE t TFF t w RPF t w SPF t w TPF t
w CPF t w HPF t TFF t DTE t
          
       
  (10)  
where: w1, w2, w3, w4, w5 are trust factor weights. They are independent with each other and adjustable 
with different practical applications and satisfy:  
1 2 3 4 5 1 w w w w w        (11)  
(2) ITE Evaluation Approach  
Evaluation  subject  i  collects  other  nodes’  opinions  on  the  evaluated  object  j  as  the  indirect 
recommendation values. In order to decrease network communication payload and avoid trust recycle 
recursion, the recommendation values are confined to direct trust value  of the common neighbors 
owned by both node i and j. As shown in the Figure 2, node i can only get the trust recommendation of 
j from k1, k2 and k3. Trust recommendation value is as follows according to the principle of trust 
transfer decline: 
, , , ( ) ( ) ( ) i j i k k j ITE t DTE t DTE t    (12)  
where k is the common neighbor of both node i and j. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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4.2. The Method of Integrated Trust Value 
Generally, the evaluated object has many neighbor nodes, and every neighbor has the direct trust 
value  and  indirect  trust  value  of  the  evaluated  object.  To  realize  the  fuzziness,  subjectivity  and 
uncertainty of trust evaluation, the D-S evidence theory method is adopted to obtain the integrated trust 
value instead of the simple weighted-average one. 
The trust value of evaluation made by subject to object is obtained in Section 4.1. Based on it, we 
use the membership function of nodes’ trust classification to calculate the basic confidence level of 
trust evidence to the ‘Distrust’, ‘Uncertain’, ‘Trust’ propositions of nodes. Then the integrated trust 
value of the object is acquired by composing the direct and indirect trust value which is based on the 
revised Dempster integration rules.  
4.2.1. Trust Vector 
In the process of integrating trust, the trust level of node i to j is indicated in vector form. The direct, 
indirect and integrated trust vectors of node i to j are: 
, , , , ( ) ( ({ }), ({ , }), ({ }))
D D D
i j i j i j i j VDTE t m T m T T m T     
1 1 1 1
, , , , ( ) ( ({ }), ({ , }), ({ }))
k k k k
i j i j i j i j VITE t m T m T T m T   
 
...                    (13)
 
, , , , ( ) ( ({ }), ({ , }), ({ }))
l l l l k k k k
i j i j i j i j VITE t m T m T T m T     
, , , , ( ) ( ({ }), ({ , }), ({ })) i j i j i j i j VAT t m T m T T m T     
According to Equations (10) and (12), the probability forms of direct and indirect trust value of 
object  j  what  the  subject  i  gets  are  defined  as  DTEi,j(t)  and  ITEi,j(t).  Using  the  corresponding 
membership functions in Section  3.2, we compute the  fuzzy membership grades of node j  to the 
‘Distrust’, ‘Uncertain’ and ‘Trust’ grade. The fuzzy membership grades of DTEi,j(t), u1
D, u2
D, u3
D, and 
the grades of ITEi,j(t), u1
I, u2
I, u3
I are calculated by: 
1 1 , 1 1 ,
2 2 , 2 2 ,
3 3 , 3 3 ,
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( )) and ( ( ))
( ( )) ( ( ))
DI
i j i j
DI
i j i j
DI
i j i j
u u DTE t u u ITE t
u u DTE t u u ITE t
u u DTE t u u ITE t
 
  
  
  (14)  
If we regard the membership function of nodes’ trust classification as the basic confidence function 
of propositions{−T}{T, −T}{T}, u1(t), u2(t) and u3(t) respectively stand for the support levels of trust 
evidences to the ‘Distrust’, ‘Uncertain’ and ‘Trust’ grade. At this point, mi,j
D({−T}), mi,j
D({T, −T}) and 
mi,j
D({T}), the components of direct trust vector VDTEi,j(t), are respectively equal to u1
D, u2
D and u3
D. 
Similarly, mi,j
k({−T}), mi,j
k({T, −T}) and mi,j
k ({T}), the components of indirect trust vector VITEi,j(t), 
correspond to u1
I, u2
I and u3
I, respectively.  
4.2.2. Integrating the Trust Value 
In this section, we combine the direct and indirect trust values of node j to get the integrated trust 
value. The integration process is in accordance with the revised Dempster combination rule, which is 
described in detail in the following. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Assume that Bel1 and Bel2 are two trust degree functions that on the same recognizing frame Ω, 
their basic trust degree function are m1 and m2. If                           , the orthogonal of Bel1 
and Bel2 is Bel = Bel1 θ Bel2, where A ∈  Ω. And m, the basic trust degree function of Bel can be 
expressed as follows: 
1
12
( ( )
( ) ( )
1
( ) 0
X Y A
m X m Y
m A m A m A
K
AA
m

 
      
    
  
 2 ）
（ ） 　
，
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
  (15)  
12 ( ) ( )
XY
K m X m Y
 
    (16)  
As shown in Figure 2, at the end of period t, node i makes an integrated trust evaluation on node j. 
From human’s action model and the trust’s subjectivity, we know that the weight of direct and indirect 
trust values shouldn’t be the same. The weight of VDTEj(t) and VITEj(t) should be modified. Assume 
the weight of direct trust value is 1, and the indirect evidence’s weight is changed according to the 
similarity between direct and indirect trust value. On this basis, we use the Equations (15) and (16) to 
calculate the integrated trust value VATi,j(t) (subject i to object j).  
Next, the course of modification evidential weight is described. If node i gets l indirect trust values 
to evaluated node j, the difference between any indirect and direct evidence are as follows: 
 
2 2
, , , , , , , , ,
11
22 ( ) ( ) ( 2 , )
n n n n
n
k k k k D T D D D
k i i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j D t m m D m m m m m m         (17)  
The     
             and     
          , defined in the Equation (13), are indirect and direct trust vector,  respectively. 
When  the  evidence  difference       >  ξ,  it  usually  means  that  a  malicious  node  is  sending  bogus 
information. Then, the similarity parameter between different evidences is modulated according to 
Equations (13) and (17):  
,, ( ) 1 ( )
nn k i k i S t D t    (18)  
From the Equation (18), the modified weight of indirect evidence is:  
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
({ }) ( ) ({ })
({ }) ( ) ({ })
({ , }) 1 ({ }) ({ })
nn
n
nn
n
n n n
kk
i j k i i j
kk
i j k i i j
k k k
i j i j i j
m T S t m T
m T S t m T
m T T m T m T
  
      

       
  (19)  
Above all, the indirect evidence can be modified as:  
, , , , ( ) ( ({ }), ({ , }), ({ }))
n n n n k k k k
i j i j i j i j VITE t m T m T T m T          (20)  
According to Equations (10), (15), (16) and (20), the integrated trust value is as follows: 
, , ,
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )
n
l
k D
i j i j i j
n
m A m A m A
l 
      (21)  
Finally [26], the eventual basic confidence assignment value is established by Equation (21), if the 
decision model satisfies: Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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,,
,
,,
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

   

 
  
  (22)  
Then main subject node i regards node j as trust, and add node j into its trustworthiness list. In like 
manner, node j can be marked ‘Uncertain’ or ‘Distrust’.  
5. Simulations 
We used MatLab as simulation tool to analyze the performances of the NBBTE algorithm in this 
section, which includes: trust evaluation of credible nodes, incredible nodes, and malicious nodes, as 
well as the influence of factors on the trust evaluation. The concrete simulation scene is a square area 
of 100 m ×  100 m, with 100 randomly deployed nodes. Here the communication radius is 20 m. We 
assume node i is subject node and node j is evaluated node, overlapping part of two circles is the 
common  neighbor  of  evaluation  and  evaluated  node  (Figure  3).  From  the  viewpoint  of  rigorous 
security requirement, the pessimistic initialization strategy of trust value is adopted, and the initial trust 
state  of  nodes  is  set  as  incredible.  Some  parameters  vary  with  the  scenes  and  the  purposes  of 
experiment and will be explained in detail. 
Figure 3. The distribution map of random nodes. 
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5.1. Analysis of Trust Evaluation 
Preferences: In this section, w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = w5 = 0.2, security degree SG = 1, behavioral 
coefficient μ = 1, time factor TFF(t) changes with nodes’ trust value. When the trust value of node j 
increases gradually, TFF(t) = 0.2, in contrast, TFF(t) = 0.8. If all the change rates of trust factors are in 
the range  of 10% ~  20%, node  j is thought to be  a non-malicious  node,  else if the change rates  
are 50%, node j is abnormal and has malicious or self actions. 
The change tendency of node membership grade to three basic trust degree functions reflects the 
effectiveness of revised D-S evidence theory. In this section, the character of ‘trust is hard to acquire 
and easy to lose’ should be expressed. Simulation results are shown in Figure 4. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Figure 4. The membership grade of the distrustful actions. 
 
Firstly, we assume the actions of each node in network are normal. In Figure 4, when the trust 
evaluation system tends to be stable, trust value of node j increases slowly. Therefore, its membership 
grade to ‘Trust’ increases gradually and the one to  ‘uncertain’ accordingly decreases.  Meanwhile, 
integrated trust value is higher than both direct and indirect trust value. That is because the proposed 
scheme adopts D-S theory to integrate trust values of nodes which lends the reality of node j to be 
represented better. On the contrary, using the weighted-average method, integrated trust value is lower 
than direct trust value, which fails to show the advantage of trust value integration. 
Secondly, in order to reflect that the NBBTE can achieve the character of ‘trust is hard to acquire 
and easy to lose’, we assume the actions of each node in network are abnormal when the trust value 
measure up to the peak. It can be seen from Figure 4 that the evaluation model reflects nodes’ change 
in acutely behavior and has more sensitive change to malicious actions. The trust  value increases 
slowly for fifteen periods when a node collaborates well with others. However, when the node begins 
to uncooperative, its trust value decreases quickly to nearly zero in only  four periods. This result 
verifies the NBBTE represents the character ‘trust is hard to acquire and easy to lose’. 
5.2. The Influence of Malicious Nodes 
Preferences:  the  number  of  malicious  nodes  in  the  common  neighbors  of  both  node  i  and  j  
are 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. Other preferences are the same as Section 5.1. Most existing 
trust evaluation algorithms adopt the average methods to calculate the trust value of evaluated nodes, 
which can not reflect the actual contribution of different subject nodes (direct and indirect nodes).  
In this section, the function of NBBTE algorithm is assessed by introducing different proportions of 
malicious nodes, which send bogus indirect trust values. The trust difference between average method 
and the proposed scheme is used to show the advantages of NBBTE algorithm. Assume that evaluation 
subject  i  is credible  and  the  membership degrees  of  malicious  nodes  are  opposite compared  with 
normal ones. We can see from Figure 5 that the two schemes in membership degree to ‘TRUST’ tend 
to  be  stable  gradually  with  evaluation  time,  but  the  more  the  malicious  nodes,  the  greater  the 
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difference. That’s because that NBBTE algorithm applies the revised Dempster rule of combination, 
which modulates indirect weight according to the evidence differences between direct and indirect 
trust value. Thus, the proposed scheme takes fuzziness and subjectivity of trust in consideration. With 
the increasing of malicious nodes, weight modulation shows more advantage.  
Figure 5. The comparison between NBBTE and weighed-average method. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In order to identify selfish and malicious nodes efficiently and solve the security problems for node 
failure or capture in WSNs, this paper proposes a trust evaluation algorithm based on behavior strategy 
banding D-S belief theory, which successfully underlines the fuzziness, subjectivity and usability of 
trust. The core works of the algorithm (NBBTE) include the following parts:  
Establish trust factors by considering network’s practical application environment. Then make both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis to calculate the direct and indirect trust value.  
Obtain the membership degree of trust value to trust grade by fuzziness set theory and accordingly 
form the basic input vector of evidence theory. 
Revise the Dempster rule of combination and modulate similarity coefficient in accordance with 
differences between indirect and direct evidences to integrate the trust value of evaluated node.  
At  the end,  the simulations  show that  the  scheme  can  assess  nodes’  trustworthiness  efficiently 
accounting for subjectivity, uncertainty and fuzziness of trust evaluation. Furthermore, it can represent 
the feature that ‘trust is hard to acquire and easy to lose’ and improve the security of networks.  
The process of trust evaluation may need excess energy and time costs due to the cooperation and 
communication  with  neighbors,  and  the  memory  costs  also  increase  with  the  parameter  numbers, 
algorithm precision and network density. However, to enhance the network security, a compromise has 
to  be  made  between  the  trust  and  the  resource  consumption.  And  we  believe  that  the  resource 
constraint of nodes is likely to be resolved in the future due to the technical development. 
As  future  work  a  real  experiment  is  being  designed  to  estimate  the  performance  of  algorithm. 
Moreover, applications based on node trust are being considered, such as routing, data aggregation  
and so on.   
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